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Bahena v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 126 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 57 (December 30,
2010) 1
CIVIL PROCEDURE – DISCOVERY SANCTIONS
Summary
The Nevada Supreme Court denied Goodyear’s request for a rehearing regarding
the Court’s ruling in Bahena I. 2 Additionally, the Court clarified that evidentiary
hearings are not mandatory for non-case concluding sanctions.
Disposition/Outcome
The Court denied Goodyear’s rehearing request because the Court did not
overlook or misapprehend material facts or law or controlling legal authority. 3
Additionally, Nevada case law does not require an evidentiary hearing for non-case
concluding sanctions and due process did not require an evidentiary hearing here.
Factual and Procedural History
Two discovery disputes led to the district court’s discovery sanctions against
Goodyear. First, the discovery commissioner found that Goodyear was not acting in
good faith when it failed to adequately respond to interrogatories and production
requests. 4 Second, Goodyear failed to present a Goodyear representative for a deposition
after the discovery commissioner denied its motion for a protective order. 5
Initially, the district court struck Goodyear’s answer as to both liability and
damages. 6 Goodyear moved for reconsideration and the district court heard the matter on
January 18, 2007. 7 At that hearing the attorneys for Bahena and Goodyear made factual
representations and answered the district court’s questions. 8 The district court ruled that
Goodyear’s conduct was prejudicial but reduced the sanctions, striking Goodyear’s
answer as to liability but not as to damages. 9
A jury awarded Bahena a judgment in excess of $30 million 10 and Goodyear
appealed the discovery sanctions. In Bahena I the Court held that the district court did
not abuse its discretion when sanctioning Goodyear because it exercised proper authority
under NRCP 37(b)(d). 11 Bahena I also ruled that the nature of a hearing for non-case
concluding sanctions is left to the district court’s discretion. 12
Goodyear sought a rehearing, arguing that the Court 1) misapplied Nevada law; 2)
deprived Goodyear of due process; 3) created a double standard between plaintiffs and
defendants; and 4) contradicted other jurisdictions.
1

By Michael Gianelloni
Bahena v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 126 Nev. ___, 235 P.3d 592.
3
NEV. R. APP. P. 40(c)(2).
4
Bahena, 235 P.3d at 594.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 595.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 596.
11
Id. at 597.
12
Id. at 601.
2

Discussion
A.

Nevada Case Law

The Court explained it followed Nevada precedent for sanctions discussed in
Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Building. 13 In Young, the Court stated it would not substitute its
judgment for the district court’s judgment in an abuse of discretion review, 14 and that a
dismissal sanction need not be preceded by less severe sanctions. 15
The Court explained it also considered Foster v. Dingwall 16 before ruling in
Bahena I. Dingwall held that NRCP 37(b)(2)(C) and 37(d) give the district court the
authority to strike pleadings for failure to obey discovery orders or attend its own
deposition. 17 Additionally, the Court stated that Nevada does not follow the federal
model, which requires progressive sanctions for failure to comply with discovery orders.
The Court then held that district courts have discretion in deciding what factors it
considers when determining discovery sanctions.
B.

Due Process and the Sufficiency of the January 18, 2007 Hearing

The Court next stated that the January 18, 2007 hearing afforded Goodyear
sufficient due process. This dispute did not require a full evidentiary hearing because the
witnesses were attorneys, who are bound to act with candor before tribunals by the
Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC). 18 RPC 3.3 allowed the district court to
receive factual representations from the attorneys without the need for cross-examination.
The majority then agreed with the dissent that evidentiary hearings should be
encouraged when there are disputed issues of material fact, and that witnesses can assist
district courts in making findings of fact. However, the Court noted that Goodyear
requested an evidentiary hearing, but did not describe what evidence the district court
should consider other than the attorney’s statements at the January 18, 2007 hearing.
C.

Double Standard

The Court noted that plaintiffs and defendants receive similar treatment for
discovery abuses under Nevada law. It then explained that Goodyear incorrectly relied
upon Nevada Power v. Fluor Illinois 19 to support its argument that answers dismissed as
to liability require full evidentiary hearings. In Nevada Power, the district court
dismissed the complaint with prejudice, 20 ending the case. Here, Goodyear still had the
right to contest damages. The Court declined to extend Nevada Power’s holding to noncase concluding discovery sanctions.
D.
13

Authority from Other States
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The Court reiterated that case law from other jurisdictions is not controlling. It
then noted that none of the cases Goodyear cited from other jurisdictions require
evidentiary hearings in all cases before a trial court can strike a defendant’s answer as to
liability only. The Court pointed out that the appellate court affirmed the striking of an
answer without an evidentiary hearing in some of the cases. 21 In other cases the appellate
court reversed the striking because of the specific facts in those cases, but because of a
blanket rule. 22 The Court also noted that some of the cases Goodyear cited emphasized
the trial court’s authority to impose severe sanctions when necessary. 23
The Court then addressed a case where the Colorado Supreme Court reversed a
discovery sanction because the sanction was not commensurate with the harm. 24 The
Court stressed that though Colorado requires a proportionate sanction, it does not require
an evidentiary hearing for all sanctions striking an answer as to liability only.
Dissenting Opinion
The dissent argued that due process required a rehearing. It stated that disputed
issues of fact existed concerning what discovery violations occurred, whether they were
willful, whose fault created the delay, and whether there was prejudice. The dissent
pointed out that the issue was whether this non-case concluding discovery sanction
required an evidentiary hearing, not whether all non-case concluding discovery sanctions
require an evidentiary hearing.
The dissent then noted that the discovery violations were relatively minor, unlike
those in Young and Nevada Power. Goodyear’s violations concerned how it organized
documents it produced, not the destruction or fabrication of evidence. Additionally, the
experts for whom the documents were produced admitted they had previously read the
documents and did not need them for their opinions. This raised questions for the dissent
of whether there was actual evidentiary prejudice.
The dissent concluded that the majority moved away from the clear Nevada
precedent that disputed questions of fact concerning willfulness, prejudice or
proportionality require an evidentiary hearing. The majority replaced this with an unclear
discretionary standard.
Conclusion
The Court stated that the district court was within its power to administer this
sanction through NRCP 37(d) and the court’s inherent equitable power. The Court
denied the rehearing because it did not overlook or misapprehend material facts or law or
controlling legal authority in Bahena I when it affirmed the district court’s ruling.
Additionally, evidentiary hearings are not mandatory for non-case concluding sanctions.
The dissent argued the controlling authority the majority overlooked, misapplied or failed
to consider was that of due process.
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